



Director of
Central
Intelligence

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Prospects for US Military Access Abroad

A Country-by-Country Appraisal (U)

**A Research Study for
National Intelligence Estimate 4/2-88**

***This Research Study represents
the views of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.***

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NI RS 88-10003
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Intelligence Sources
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NI RS 88-10003

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*Information available as of 21 October 1988 was used
in the preparation of this Research Study.*

*The following intelligence organizations participated
in the preparation of this Research Study:*

The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
The Office of Intelligence Support,
Department of the Treasury

also participating:

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters, Marine Corps

*This Research Study was approved for publication by the
Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.*

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
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
Discussion

This study complements NIE 4/2-88, *Prospects for US Military Access Abroad*. It appraises the status of and outlook for US access in each of the foreign countries where US military forces have any form of continuing access. The annex to this study addresses analogous prospects in each of the foreign countries beyond the Soviet periphery where Soviet forces currently enjoy such access.

¹ The descriptions under each country heading of the nature and extent of US access are skeletal and often incomplete, meant only to convey a general sense of the significance of US military facilities and activities in that country.











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


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


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
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



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














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


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


Africa and Neighboring Islands ³

³ Excluding Egypt, which is covered in the section on the Middle East and South Asia. (U)


Figure 4
US Military Access Abroad: Africa and Neighboring Islands

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.



US Security Assistance to Host Countries ^a
in Africa and Neighboring Islands

Million US \$ ^b



^a These figures constitute the total of ESF disbursements, FMS credits, MAP grants, MASF, and IMET.

^b Total amounts less than \$500,000 have been ignored.



successors, whether they be military officers or members of the increasingly strident civilian opposition, is likely to go so far as to revoke US access rights. However, spurred by growing Liberian nationalism that has lately included a large anti-American component (probably owing to perceived US Government support of Doe), a successor government might ostentatiously stand up to the United States by demanding additional money in return for continued access.


Actually, the Doe regime is already doing that. Angered by reductions in US aid, the Liberians canceled two joint military exercises and refused, for a time, to let a US military team inspect facilities at Roberts Airfield. We suspect that Doe would back away from the confrontation if faced with the complete loss of US support, but there are too many uncertainties in Liberia's muddled economic and political situation to invest much confidence in that or any other assessment. In response to a continuing US refusal to restore security assistance to its previous level, or to additional aid cuts in the future, we can envision the mercurial Doe responding with further restrictions on US access.


Liberia


Nature of Access. US access in Liberia is more extensive than in any other African host country. The US military forces have access, if needed, to both the port of Monrovia and Roberts International Airfield. The airfield can be used for the rapid deployment of US forces into Africa and the Persian Gulf and was so used in 1978 when the US military responded to the insurgency in Zaire's Shaba Region. Liberia also hosts a number of US communications and intelligence facilities.

Outlook. Continued US access to Liberian facilities is far from ensured. The Doe regime has lurched from crisis to crisis. Its political legitimacy is widely questioned. A military coup could be attempted at any time with little or no warning. None of Doe's likely











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
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Annex




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
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